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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This is a civil action for insurance benefits, damages and 
attorney's fees resulting from wrongful denial of a health 
insurance claim. 
Jurisdiction of the court appealed from is based on Utah 
Annotated Section 78-3-4(1) (1953). 
Jurisdiction of the Utah Supreme Court to hear this appeal is 
based on Utah Code Annotated Section 78-2-2(3)(j). This case has 
been certified by the Utah Court of Appeals to the Utah Supreme 
Court pursuant to Rule 4 3 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
Judgment of the trial court was entered September 5, 1990. 
Appellants1 Notice of Appeal was served and filed on September 18, 
1990. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Two issues are raised on this appeal. First, whether the 
court properly granted appellee's Motion for Summary Judgment on 
the basis that appellants1 causes of action are governed by the 
Federal Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA). Secondly, 
whether the court erred in limiting appellantss award of attorney's 
fees solely to those issues upon which they had prevailed. 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
Federal Employee Retirement Income Securi ty Act of 1974, 29 
U.S.C.A. 1001 e t . seq. (ERISA). 
1 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On or about December 25, 1988 plaintiff/appellant, Jackie 
Robertson, injured her neck. Jackie Robertson submitted claims for 
the medical care she received to Gem Insurance Company. 
Defendant/Appellee, Gem Insurance Company denied coverage alleging 
that Jackie Robertson's injury was a pre-existing condition. On 
July 20th 1989, appellants initiated suit for wrongful denial of 
the insurance claim in the Fourth Judicial District Court of Utah 
County, State of Utah. On September 11, 1989 defendant/appellee 
filed a Motion to Dismiss on the basis that ERISA governed the case 
at bar and therefore preempted Utah state law which allowed for 
claims such as breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing, intentional infliction of emotional distress and punitive 
damages. On November 6th 1989, the trial court granted the 
defendant's/appellee's Motion to Dismiss, allowing trial on only 
the issue of plaintiffs/appellants claim for policy benefits and 
attorney fees. Trial was held and final judgment was entered on 
August 24, 1990 for the appellants, Robertson, and against Gem 
Insurance Company. Plaintiffs/Appellants submit that the trial 
court erred in granting the defendant's/appellee's Motion for 
Summary Judgment, in ruling that ERISA governed the case at bar and 
in dismissing the appellants' claims for breach of implied covenant 
of good faith and fair dealing, intentional infliction of emotional 
distress and punitive damages. 
2 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. On or about October 26, 1988, Mountain States Steel, 
appellant Craig Robertson's employer, applied for membership in the 
Intermountain Employers Trust (IMET) a multiple employers trust 
which had contracted for group health insurance with appellee, Gem 
Insurance Company, for purposes of allowing employees to acquire 
group health insurance. (See Statement of Facts in defendant/ 
appellee Gem Insurance Company's Memorandum in Support of it's 
Motion to Dismiss, R. 35) Mountain States Steel was accepted by 
IMET on November 1, 1988 (See R. 36) 
2. Appellants Jackie Robertson and Craig Robertson became 
beneficiaries under the Gem Policy of Insurance also effective 
November 1, 1988. (See R. 36) 
3. During the relevant policy period appellant Jackie 
Robertson incurred certain medical expenses. Notice and proof of 
loss was given to appellee Gem Insurance Company. (See plaintiff's 
complaint below R. 1, 2, and Memorandum Decision R. 239) 
4. Benefits were denied appellants by appellee. (See 
plaintiff's complaint R. 2, 3 and Memorandum Decision R. 239) 
5. On or about July 20, 1989, appellants initiated the 
present action alleging that appellee wrongfully denied coverage, 
breached the relevant terms of the insurance policy, and breached 
an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Appellant 
further alleged that appellee Gem Insurance Company made 
representations to appellants that were known to be false or 
misleading and at the time that such representations were made that 
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Gem Insurance knew or should have known such representations would 
cause appellants emotional distress. Appellants further plead for 
punitive damages based on Gem Insurance Company's alleged conduct. 
Appellants further prayed for all direct and consequential damages 
incurred as a result of appellee's breach and other conduct. (See 
plaintiff's complaint R. 1-4) 
6. Appellee subsequently made a motion to dismiss all of 
appellants' causes of action with the exception of an action for 
policy benefits only. The basis of such motion was that 
appellants' causes of action are preempted by the Federal Employee 
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), 29 U.S.C.A. 1001 
et. seq. (R. 35). After written memoranda parties were filed and 
oral arguments were held. The Court held that appellants' causes 
of action were governed by ERISA and dismissed appellants' causes 
of action with the exception of that for policy benefits. (R. 84, 
85) 
7. A non-jury trial was held on the 25th day of June 1990, 
regarding the issues of policy benefits and attorney's fees. 
8. Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Judgment were 
entered by the Court on the 5th day of September 1990. The Court 
found that policy benefits had been wrongfully denied appellant 
Jackie Robertson and that appellants were entitled to attorney's 
fees in the amount of $65 an hour for time spent by appellants' 
attorneys regarding such issues upon which appellants prevailed, 
(particularly a question of whether policy benefits had been 
wrongfully denied in the amount of benefits due under the policy) 
4 
(R. 252-258) 
9. Appellee tendered judgment in the amount of $13,764.22, 
such sum representing the amount of policy benefits due and such 
attorney's fees as awarded by the Court. Such amount was accepted 
by appellants and satisfaction of judgment was entered. (R. 260, 
261) 
10. This appeal was then taken by appellants Robertson (See 
Notice for Appeal R.262) 
11. Prior to trial of the matter but after the incurrence and 
submission of medical bills by appellant Jackie Robertson, Gem 
Insurance Company unilaterally terminated its agreement to provide 
insurance to Mountain States Steel. (R. 119, 232, (Deffs exhibit 
No. 1.)) 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
BECAUSE APPELLANTS APPEAL FOR THE GRANTING OF A MOTION 
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT BELOW, ALL QUESTIONS OF FACT MUST 
BE RESOLVED IN APPELLANTS1 FAVOR. 
Appellants challenge the Court's entry of Summary Judgment 
particularly holding that appellants1 causes of action are 
preempted by the Employment Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 
29 U.S.C.A. 1001 et. seq. (ERISA). As will be pointed out below 
whether or not the relevant policy of insurance falls under ERISA 
is a question of fact. Any questions of fact must be resolved in 
favor of appellants. (See eg. Themy v. Seagull Enterprises Inc. 
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595 P.2d 526 (Utah 1979); Briaas v. Holcomb. 740 P.2d 281 (Utah 
App. 1987) ; Copper State Leasing Company v. Blacker Appliance and 
Furniture Company, 770 P.2d 88 (1988); Reeves v. Geiay 
Pharmaceutical Inc. 764 P.2d 636 (Utah App. 1988)). 
Likewise, in considering an appeal from a granting of Summary 
Judgment, the Appellate Court must view the facts in the light 
most favorable to a losing party below. See eg. , Blue Cross and 
Blue Shield v. State, 779 P.2d 634 (Utah 1989). 
The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 governs 
"employee welfare benefit plans" (See 29 U.S.C.A. Section 1002 (3) 
and Section 1003(a)).1 ERISA provides for pre-emption of state law 
insofar as it purports to apply to "employee benefit plans" (See 29 
U.S.C.A. Section 1144).2 The Supreme Court of the United States in 
Pilot Life Insurance Company v. Dedeaux, 107 S.Ct. 1549 (1987), 
held that ERISA preempts all state law causes of action stemming 
from a failure to pay benefits under an ERISA-covered plan. Hence 
in order for appellee Gem Insurance Company to claim that its 
*29 U.S.C.A. 1002 (3) provides: "The term ^employee benefit 
plan1 or xplanf means an employee welfare benefit plan or an 
employee pension benefit plan or a plan which is both an employee 
welfare benefit plan and an employee pension benefit plan." Also 
29 U.S.C.A. 1003 (a) (1) provides: "Except as provided in 
subsection (b) of this section and in sections 1051, 1081, and 1101 
of this title, this subchapter shall apply to any employee benefit 
plan if it is established or maintained- (1) by any employer 
engaged in commerce or in any industry or activity affecting 
commerce;.." 
229 U.S.C.A. 1144 (a) provides: "Except as provided in 
subsection (b) of this section, the provisions of this subchapter 
and subchapter III of this chapter shall supersede any and all 
State laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any 
employee benefit plan described in section 1003(a) of this title 
and not exempt under section 1003(b) of this title M 
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insurance policy is governed by ERISA it must show that the policy 
of the insurance of which appellants Jackie and Craig Robertson are 
beneficiaries, is part of a "employee benefit plan" under ERISA. 
Whether or not an employee benefit plan exists "is a question of 
fact, to be answered in light of all the surrounding facts and 
circumstances from the point of view of a reasonable person", Kanne 
v. Connecticut General Life Insurance Company, 859 F.2d 96, 98 
(9th-Cir. 1988); See also, Savble v. Blue Cross of S- Cal., 256 
Cal. Rptr. 820 (1989); Taaaart Corp, v. Life and Health Benefits 
Admin., 617 F.2d 1208 (1980); Donovan V. Dillingham, 688 F.2d 1367 
(11th Cir. 1982) . 
POINT II 
APPELLEE GEM INSURANCE COMPANYfS POLICY OF HEALTH 
INSURANCE WAS NOT A PART OF A "EMPLOYEE BENEFIT PLAN" 
AND HENCE IS NOT COVERED BY ERISA-
Appellants do not dispute the fact that, if the insurance 
policy question constituted a "employee benefit plan" under ERISA, 
the provisions in applicable law regarding ERISA bar State Law 
claims as applied to this case- (See Pilot Life, supra) However, 
appellants maintain that the bare purchase of health insurance 
through an employer in order to take advantage of group rates does 
not constitute an "employee benefit plan" and therefore ERISA is 
unapplicable. 
This point was made clear by the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in the case of Taaaart Corp- v, Life 
and Health Benefits Administration, 617 F.2d 1208 (1980). In 
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Taggart. the Fifth Circuit held that where health insurance is 
purchased through an employer solely for the purpose of receiving 
group rates, and the policy is not owned, controlled or 
administered by the employer, such insurance does not constitute an 
employee benefit plan invoking jurisdiction under ERISA. Speaking 
of such health insurance policies, the Fifth Circuit stated: 
Considering the history, structure and purposes of ERISA, we 
cannot believe that the Act regulates bare purchases of health 
insurance whereas here the purchasing employer neither 
directly nor indirectly owns, controls, administers or assumes 
responsibility for the policy or its benefits. . . .[emphasis 
added] 
Taggart supra, at 1211. The record below reflects only that 
Mountain States Steel, appellant Craig Robertson's employer, joined 
Intermountain Employers Trust in order to achieve group status for 
its employees so that they could enter into an insurance agreement 
with appellee Gem Insurance Company and become beneficiaries of the 
Gem Insurance policy. Appellee provided no information or any 
reason to believe that Mountain States Steel either owned, 
controlled, or administered the relevant insurance policy or had 
any control over the submission, adjustment and payment of claims 
thereunder.3 
Furthermore, in order for an "employee benefit plan" to exist, 
the employer must intend to create an ERISA governed employee 
benefit plan, beyond mere application for insurance and payment of 
premiums. The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh 
Appellants conceded at Oral Argument that Mountain States 
Steel's sole involvement with appellee Gem Insurance Company was 
its payroll deductions for premiums and a partial contribution to 
the premium. 
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Circuit has had occasion to hold: 
An employer does not become a participant in, or establish or 
maintain, a plan by applying for insurance and paying premiums 
for what it understands to be insurance without any knowledge 
that the plan exists. Establishing, maintaining, or 
participating in a plan requires an intent, which presupposes 
an awareness of the existence of the plan. . . 
Wayne v. Columbus Agency Service Corp., 657 F.2d 692, 699 (7th Cir. 
1977) • The Supreme Court of Nevada in Turnbow v. Pacific Mutual 
Life Insurance Company, 765 P.2d 1160 (Nev. 1988), addressed a 
factually similar case to the one at bar. 
In Turnbow the plaintiff was a beneficiary of a group health 
insurance policy (specifically purchased through a multi-employer 
trust (Beneficial Employees Security Trust (BEST)). BEST in turn 
acquired coverage through defendant Pacific Mutual Life Insurance 
Company. Like appellants Robertson in the present action, 
plaintiff, Turnbow, sued Pacific Mutual for breach of contract, bad 
faith, affliction of emotional distress and punitive damages. 
Pacific Mutual claimed that their policy was an "employee benefit 
plan" under ERISA and hence state law causes of action were 
preempted. The Supreme Court of Nevada reviewed Federal law and 
determined that: 
Unless there is some indication that an employer is committed 
to or has guaranteed the continuation of such benefits, 
nothing is created for ERISA to protect and no plan exist. 
Appellant did not purchase the health insurance for her 
employees pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement or a 
practice of providing such benefits. Nor is there any 
indication that the appellant intended to guarantee the 
continued furnishing of the benefits. ERISA does not regulate 
the bare purchase of health insurance where, as here, there is 
no indication that the employer intended to guarantee the 
continued furnishing of the benefits. 
Turnbow. supra, at 1161. 
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As noted above in appellants' Statement of Facts, appellant 
Craig Robertson's employer Mountain States Steel, was not obligated 
to continue to provide insurance with IMET or Gem Insurance 
Company. In fact, Gem Insurance unilaterally terminated the 
insurance arrangement with Mountain States Steel. 
While the Supreme Court of the United States has had a number 
of occasions to address the scope of ERISA preemption and the 
possible remedies available under ERISA when an "employee benefit 
plan" is found to exist,4 appellants are aware of only one U.S. 
Supreme Court case where the factual existence of an "employee 
benefit plan" was discussed. The United States Supreme Court in 
the case of Fort Halifax Packing Co. Inc. v. Covne. 107 S.Ct. 2211 
(1987) stated: 
Congress intended preemption to afford employers the 
advantages of a uniform set of administrative procedures 
governed by a single set of regulations. This concern only 
arises, however, with respect to benefits whose provision by 
nature requires an ongoing administrative program to meet the 
employers obligation. It is for that reason that Congress 
preempted the state laws relating to plans, rather than simply 
to benefits. [emphasis in original] 
Id. at 2217. 
In another case virtually identical to the one at bar, the 
California Court of Appeal, 2nd District, applied the rationale 
set forth by the United States Supreme Court in Fort Halifax, 
specifically, what the California Court labeled an "administrative 
scheme test" regarding what constitutes an "employee benefit plan". 
In Sayble v. Blue Cross of S. Cal., 256 Cal. Rptr. 820 (1989), 
4See eg., Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 107 S.Ct. 1549 (1987) 
and Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor. 107 S.Ct. 1542 (1987). 
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the plaintiff Sayble was employed by Swiss American Credit Jewelers 
(Swiss American). Swiss American applied to a multiple employer 
trust (National Employers Security Trust (NEST)). NEST in turn 
issued a group health insurance policy through Blue Cross of 
Southern California. A dispute regarding policy benefits arose and 
plaintiff Sayble filed a complaint against Blue Cross seeking 
declaratory relief as well as alleging breaches of duty of good 
faith, fair dealing, fiduciary statutory duties and a further plead 
for compensatory and punitive damages. Blue Cross filed a Motion 
for Summary Judgment alleging ERISA preemption. The trial court, 
like the trial court in the case at bar, found that the policy of 
insurance constituted an "employee benefit plan" and that the 
plaintiff's causes of action were preempted under ERISA. The case 
was appealed on a virtually identical procedural and factual 
posture as the case at bar. The Sayble court first notes that "the 
preemptive aspect of ERISA protects employers from conflicting an 
inconsistent state and local regulations of employment benefit 
plans." Citing Shaw v. Delta Airlines Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 99 1983); 
Fort Halifax Packing Co. v. Coyne, supra. Further and with 
specific reliance on Fort Halifax the Sayble Court held: 
ERISA preempts only plans, not benefits, and nowhere in the 
statute are said terms treated as the equivalent of one 
another. * Employee benefit plan1 and *plan' are defined only 
tautologically in [29 U.S.C. Section 1002(3)], each being 
described as an * employee welfare benefit plan or employee 
pension plan or a plan which is both an employee welfare 
benefit plan and an employee pension benefit plan1. . . [The] 
United States Supreme Court observed that under the 
administrative realities of employee benefit plans, 'an 
employer makes a commitment systematically to pay certain 
benefits, undertakes a host of obligations, such as 
determining the eligibility of claimants, calculating the 
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benefit levels, making disbursements, monitoring the 
availability of funds for benefit plans, and keeping 
appropriate records in order to comply with applicable 
reporting requirements. . . » [T]hus, the existence of an ERISA 
plan depends on the extent to which the employer is involved 
in the administration of the benefit program so as to 
implicate the concerns which gave rise to ERISA. . . 
Sayble, supra at 823, 824. 
The Sayble court goes on to note again quoting Fort Halifax "to do 
little more than write a check hardly constitutes the operation of 
a benefit plan." The Sayble court reversed the trial court; 
holding that no employee benefit plan existed and hence, ERISA was 
not applicable. 
In summary, in order to qualify as an "employee benefit plan" 
under ERISA, appellee Gem Insurance Company, must show that: 
(1) Mountain States Steel intended to create an employee 
benefit plan; (2) That the group health insurance policy purchased 
was part of an ongoing obligation to provide employee benefits; 
and, (3) That the employer, Mountain States Steel, had an ongoing 
administrative duty regarding the plan. None of these elements 
were established in appellee's Motion for Summary Judgment below. 
The whole scope and thrust of ERISA itself deals with the 
regulation of the employer/employee relationship and ongoing 
fiduciary obligations. The intent of Congress in enacting ERISA 
was to provide a sword for employees in dealing with the 
preservation of their rights under employee benefit plans. 
Congress specifically stated: 
It is hereby declared to be the policy of this chapter to 
protect interstate commerce in the interest of participants in 
employee benefit plans and their beneficiaries, by requiring 
the disclosure and reporting to participants and beneficiaries 
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of financial and other information with respect thereto, by 
establishing standards of conduct, responsibility conduct, and 
obligations for fiduciaries of employee benefit plans, and by 
providing for appropriate remedies sanctions, and ready access 
to the Federal Courts. 
Three years after the enactment of ERISA Congress evidenced its 
legislative intent regarding preemption and particularly whether 
insurance products marketed to employers and employees at large 
could claim employee benefit status under ERISA and achieve pre-
emption of state control. The 94th Congress Second Session noted 
by way of House Report: 
It has come to our attention. . . that certain entrepreneurs 
have undertaken to market insurance products to employers and 
employees at large, claiming these products to be ERISA 
covered plans. . . the entrepreneur will then argue that his 
enterprise is an ERISA benefit plan which is protected, under 
ERISA's preemption provision from state regulation. We are 
concerned with this type of development, but on the basis of 
the facts provided us, we are of the opinion that these 
programs are not "employee benefit plans" as defined in [29 
U.S.C.A. Section 1002 (3)]. As described to us, these plans 
are established and maintained by entrepreneurs for the 
purposes of marketing insurance products or services to 
others. They are not established or maintained by the 
appropriate parties to confer ERISA jurisdiction, nor is the 
purpose for their establishment or maintenance appropriate to 
meet the jurisdictional prerequisites of the act. They are no 
more ERISA plans than is any other insurance policy sold to an 
employee benefit plan. . . We are mindful of the potentially 
harmful effects of an overly broad interpretation of the 
•employee benefit plan1 when coupled with the policy of [29 
U.S.C.A. Section 1144]. As we have already noted, we do not 
believe that the statute and legislative history will support 
the conclusion of what amounts to commercial products within 
the umbrella of the definition. Where a *plan* is, in affect, 
an entrepreneurial adventure, it is outside the policy of [29 
U.S.C.A. Section 1144] for reasons we have already stated. In 
short, to be properly characterized as an ERISA employee 
benefit plan, a plan must satisfy the definitional requirement 
of [29 U.S.C.A. Section 1002 (3)] in both form and substance. 
In conclusion, in support of its Motion for Summary Judgment 
regarding ERISA preemption below, appellee, Gem Insurance Company, 
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showed only that the Gem Insurance policy was purchased through an 
employer who had taken advantage of Intermountain Employers Trust 
to gain group status and achieve the benefit of group policy rates. 
There was no evidence nor do the facts suggest that the Gem 
Insurance policy is an "employee benefit plan" under ERISA 
triggering ERISA preemption. Hence, the lower courtfs granting of 
Summary Judgment must be reversed and appellants should be allowed 
to proceed on all causes of action as articulated in their 
complaint. 
POINT m 
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO ALLOW PLAINTIFF 
ALL ATTORNEY'S FEES REASONABLY INCURRED IN PROSECUTING THE 
ACTION. 
As is set forth in the lower court's Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law, appellee wrongfully denied appellants policy 
benefits under the Gem Insurance policy. The Court awarded 
appellants attorney's fees for time spent by their counsel upon 
such issues for which they prevailed. The Court did so as a matter 
of state law citing the Utah case of Mountain States Broadcasting 
Co. v. Neale. 776 P.2d 643 (Utah 1989). (See Memorandum Decision 
R. 243) . 
The lower court however, had held that the matter is preempted 
by ERISA. Any award for attorneyfs fees should have been granted 
under ERISA and not as a matter of state law. 29 U.S.C.A. Section 
1132(g)(1) provides: 
In any action under this subchapter. by a 
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participant, beneficiary, or fiduciary, the court in its 
discretion may allow reasonable attorneys fee and costs of 
action to either party. 
A five factor test has been developed by the Tenth Circuit in Eaves 
v. Penn, 587 F.2d 453 (10th Cir. 1978). The Tenth Circuit 
announced five factors relevant to an award of attorney's fees 
under ERISA: 
(1) The degree of the offending parties1 culpability or bad 
faith; (2) the degree of the ability of the offending parties 
to personally satisfy an award of attorneys fees; (3) whether 
or not an award of attorneys fees against the offending 
parties would deter other persons acting under similar 
circumstances; (4) the amount of benefit conferred on the 
member of the pension plan as a whole; and, (5) the relative 
merits of the parties1 position. 
Eves supra, at 4 65. 
M[C]ourts apply the Eves factors to every ERISA suit where 
parties request attorneys fees.11 Attorney's Fees Under ERISA: 
When Is An Award Appropriate? 71 Cornell L. Rev. 1037, 1043 
(1986). If indeed ERISA applies to appellants causes of action as 
maintained by appellees, then the lower court erred in not applying 
the provisions of ERISA and applicable case law in considering 
appellants' claim of attorney's fees below. 
Of course, appellants maintain that ERISA does not preempt 
appellants causes of action. Appellants maintain (See Point II 
above) that the lower court's granting of Summary Judgment should 
be reversed and appellants should be allowed to proceed on their 
independent causes of action. In that event appellants should be 
entitled to a full award of attorneys fees for prevailing in an 
insurance contract dispute as set forth in Canyon Country Store v. 
Bracey. 781 P.2d 414 (Utah 1989). 
15 
CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, appellants maintain that the lower court erred 
in granting appellee's Motion for Summary Judgment, particularly 
finding that, as a matter of law, relevant policy of 
health insurance was an "employee benefit plan" for purposes of 
ERISA. Appellee failed to show that the insurance policy was 
intended by the employer to constitute an "employee benefit plan," 
that the insurance policy was part of an ongoing obligation by the 
employer to provide employee benefits, nor show that the employer 
took any part whatsoever in the administration and ongoing 
operation of what is claimed to be an ERISA plan. Therefore, under 
the authority cited above, including the actual intent expressed by 
Congress, the mere purchase of an insurance policy through an 
employer who has joined a multi-employer trust in order to achieve 
group and membership status does not constitute an ERISA plan. 
The court below further erred in limiting appellants1 award to 
attorney's fees, solely to those issues upon which plaintiffs 
prevailed and in not analyzing appellants' request for attorney's 
fees under the provisions of ERISA as the court had ruled that 
ERISA governed the action. For these reasons, appellants 
respectfully request that the court's Order of Summary Judgment be 
reversed and the appellants be allowed to proceed on their common 
law claims. Further, that the court be instructed to award all 
reasonable attorney's fees pursuant to Canyon Country Store v. 
Bracev, supra, or in the alternative, consider appellants' request 
for attorney's fees under ERISA. 
16 
DATED AND SIGNED th is ?A day of February, 1991 
JEFFERY CT. PEATROSS 
IVIE & YOUNG 
Attorneys for Appellants 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
JACKIE ROBERTSON and CRAIG ) 
ROBERTSON, ] 
Plaintiffs, 
v
« ] 
GEM INSURANCE COMPANY, ; 
Defendant. 
ORDER 
i Civil No. CV 891505 
i Judge Boyd L. Park 
Defendant Gem Insurance Company ("Gem") brought on for 
hearing before the above-entitled Court its Motion to Dismiss 
certain of plaintiffs1 claims on November 3, 1989 at 1:30 p.m. 
Gem was present and represented by Jeffrey R. Oritt; plaintiffs 
were represented by Jeffery C. Peatross. The Court, having 
reviewed the memoranda of the parties, having heard argument, 
having reviewed the pleadings in tliis case, being fully apprised 
in the premises herein, and good c^use appearing therefor; 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Gem's Motion to Dismiss 
plaintiffs' causes of action for breach of implied covenant of 
good faith and fair dealing, misrepresentation, intentional 
infliction of emotional distress and punitive damages shall be 
and are hereby dismissed, with prejudice and on the merits. 
Plaintiffs' remaining claim of breach of insurance policy remains 
to be litigated. r 
DATED t h i s y day o f 4/f2s<?r~Q<?<^ , 1 9 8 9 . 
BY THE COURT: 
Boyd-1.. Park 
District Judge 
- 2 -
JEFFERY C. PEATROSSr #5221 
IVIE & YOUNG 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
48 North University Avenue 
P.O. Box 672 
Provo, Utah 84603 
375-3000 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
JACKIE ROBERTSON 
and CRAIG ROBERTSON, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
GEM INSURANCE COMPANY, 
Defendant. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
AND JUDGMENT 
Civil No. CV891505 
Judge Boyd L. Park 
The above-entitled matter having come before this 
Court for non-jury trial on the 25th day of June, 1990, 
plaintiffs having been represented by Jeffery C. Peatross of 
Ivie and Young, and defendant having been represented by 
Jeffrey R. Oritt of Tibbals, Howell, Wilkins & Oritt, the 
Court having fully considered the testimony presented and 
the arguments of counsel hereby make the following Findings 
of Fact and Conclusion of Law: 
FINDINGS OF rAC? 
1. Plaintiff Craig R^Lc^cscn had group health 
insurance provided by defendant G ^ Insurance Company 
through Craig Robertson's empl /er Mountain States Steel. 
2. The effective date of the health insurance 
policy was November 1, 1988. 
3. Plaintiff Jackie Robertson is the spouse of 
Craig Robertson and a beneficiary under the health insurance 
policy. 
4. In 1985f Jackie Robertson suffered a herniated 
cervical disk at the C6-7 level. Surgery was performed. 
5. Mrs. Robertson injured another cervical disk 
at the C4-5 level while shoveling snow on December 25, 1988. 
Such injury resulted in a surgery performed by Dr. Adams in 
March of 1989. 
6. Mrs. Robertson r: itted claims to Gem 
Insurance Company requesting coverage for the medial care 
she received associated with the C4-5 injury. 
7. Gem Insurance Company initially denied the 
coverage alleging Mrs. Robertson had other insurance 
coverage through her own employer. This matter was later 
resolved as Mrs. Robertson did not have other coverage. 
8. Gem Insurance Company subsequently denied 
coverage alleging that the C4-5 disk injury was a 
pre-existing condition. 
9. Gem Insurance Company they did so upon 
reliance of radical records received from Mounts n'n TTiew 
Hospita'' -
10. Dr. James Adams sent a letter to 'em Insurance 
Company on June 6, 1989, attempting to clarify the 
misunderstanding of Gem Insurance regarding their claim of 
pre-existing injury. In such letter Dr. Adams stated that 
Jackie Robertson had received surgery on the C6-7 cervical 
level on August 21, 1985. He stated that he performed an 
anterior discectomy at the C4-5 level. Dr. Adams stated 
particularly as follows: 
Both procedures are separate. One is not related 
to the other and they are both at different levels 
in the cervical spine. I hope this will clarify 
any misunderstanding which your office may have 
regarding any pre-existing or similar disease 
pattern. 
11. Gem Insurance Company admits receiving Dr. 
Adams letter but continued to rely upon the hospital records 
and continued to maintain that Mrs. Robertson's condition 
was pre-existing. 
12. The discrepancy between the hospital records 
and Dr. Adams1 letter was explained by Dr. Adams. He stated 
that when he dictated the hospital records upon which Gem 
Insurance Company relied upon, he did not have the proper 
summary of his office notes, including his own hand written 
notes which his nurse prepares and keeps on file for him. 
Such summary takes the form of a "white card, such "white 
card' wa3 not available when Dr. Adams dictaced the records 
relied ^pon by Gem Insurance Company. 
13. The hospital records reliev. upon by Gem 
Insurance Company where therefore not accurate. The "white 
card" accurately reflects Mrs. Robertsonfs relevant medical 
history and the section on history states: 
Neck pain. Four years ago anterior fusion C6 with 
remission of symptoms. 
12-25-88 Shoveling snow with restricted 
movements and pain, cervical spine, numbness left 
thumb and pain left arm. 
14. The Gem Insurance policy expressly excludes 
coverage of any pre-existing condition for nine months from 
the effective date of the policy, in this case November lf 
1988. 
15. A pre-existing condition is defined by the 
policy as: 
Pre-exisiting condTMon: 
The manifestati f ^^ntoms of a med4.c.--" 
condition and/or ' JQ or disease nich 
medical advice, t jervices, mr on or 
drugs was recommeuuea or received with., a twelve 
month period prior to tlie effective date. 
16. Jackie Robertson received no medical advice, 
treatment^ services, medication or drugs, nor was any 
recommended within the relevant twelve month period prior to 
the effective date of the policy (November 1, 1987 to 
November 1, 1988). 
17. Jackie Robertson had no symptoms of the C4-5 
disk injury until December 25, 1988. 
18. Gem Ir~u^ance Company did not conduct fUa.th^ r 
investigation afte receiving the June 6, 1989 letter of 
Dr. Adams. Specifically they did not call or communicate 
with Dr. Adams regarding plaintifffs condition. 
19. Plaintiffs Craig and Jackie Robertson and 
defendant Gem Insurance Company have stipulated that the 
amount of benefits disputed under the policy are $8,092.46. 
That they have further stipulated that in the event 
plaintiffs are awarded policy benefits they shall be 
entitled to interest at the rate of 10% per anum from April 
1, 1989. 
20. Plaintiffs have incurred attorneyfs fees as a 
result of prosecuting this matter, the Court finds 
reasonable attorney's fees to be $4,192.50. Such fees are 
based upon a per hourly rate of $65.00 per hour and upon 
hours spent by plaintiffs' counsel on such issues prevailed 
upon by plaintiffs. > ;/c <r,<ls <T^ /> ~ 
f^fP^WGS OF LAW 
1. The relevant policy provision defining 
pre-existing condition sets forth an objective standard. 
That standard is whether medical treatment was recommended 
or received for the relevant medical condition within twelve 
months before the effective policy date. 
2. That the plaintiff Jackie Robertson's C4-5 
cervical cc/rJiHoi* is not a "pre-existing condition" un^ .t-: 
the terms o: t"*c Gem Insurance Company's policy. 
That defendant Gem Insurance Company lad a 
duty to properly investigate the Robertson's pending claims, 
including an investigation of the apparent conflict of the 
medical history of Jackie Robertson as seen from Mountain 
View Hospital's history and physical examinationf Mountain 
View Hospital's discharge summary and Dr. Adams June 6, 
1989 letter. 
4. That as a result of defendant's failure to 
conduct such an investigation to pay benefits due to 
plaintiffs under the policy, plaintiffs have incurred costs 
and reasonable attorney's fees ir such issues resolved in 
their favor. 
jr^OMENT 
Based upon the fc g ridings of Facts and 
Conclusions of Law it is hereby oruer, judged and decreed as 
follows: 
That the plaintiffs are entitled to judgment and 
hereby award a judgment in the amount of $8,092.46 together 
with interest on such amount at the rate of 10% per anum 
from April lf 1989 to date of judgment for a total award of 
prejudgment interest of $1,160.01. Plaintiffs are hereby 
// 
// 
// 
// 
// 
awarded judgment for attorney's fees in the amount of 
$4f192.50 together with costs in the amount of $319.25f for 
a total judgment including interest, attorney's fees and 
costs in the amount of $13f764.22. 
DATED AND SIGNED this 6 day of . i<//^:^ 
/ 
1990. 
" • ) 
t }- /A 
JUDGE' BOYD L. PARK 
Approval as to form, including 
interest and cost amounts: 
Jeffrey R. Oritt 
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I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing Finding of Facts, Conclusions of Law 
and Judgment with postage prepaid thereon this J2l— daY o f 
August, 1990 to the following: 
Jeffrey R. Oritt 
TIBBALS, HOWELL, WILKINS & ORITT 
Two Fifty Seven Towers, Sutie 850 
257 East 200 South-2 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
wife 
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